Chapter presents some reflections of the topic, triggered by the Working Group's meetings and discussions.
3. The Chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part preliminarily highlights some fundamental differences between civil and criminal justice, which must be taken * The author would like to thank the Members of the Working Group for the many fruitful discussions and Marloes van Wijk for her insights on the nature of criminal justice. 1 See infra, para. 2.3.2.
into account. As the Chapter will show, the differences at hand constrain, to a certain extent, the feasibility of a cross-sectoral comparative exercise, but they by no means make it impossible. The second part looks at private international law in general and argues that some of its basic principles should be adopted in the field of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal law too. Finally, the third part draws some specific lessons from European civil procedure in particular.
Scope and Limits of the Comparison: Structural Differences between Civil and Criminal Justice
4. Before attempting a comparison between criminal law and private international law, it is necessary to highlight some fundamental limits to the feasibility of such an exercise. Civil and criminal justice serve largely different purposes and are governed by different procedural architectures. For this reason, the comparison cannot result in abrupt 'legal transplants': it would be simply impossible to transpose the mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts of civil jurisdiction existing in EU civil procedure to the field of criminal justice.
5. Despite the aforementioned limits, a cross-sectoral study of conflicts of jurisdiction can yield interesting results, from at least two points of view. Firstly, as Section 3 of this article will illustrate in detail, the evolution of private international law has been marked by the progressive emergence of some core concepts, concerning the coordination of national judicial authorities in crossborder cases. Private international law, hence, can serve as a useful 'conceptual repository' for criminal lawyers who aim at addressing the same topic in their own field of study and practice. In this respect, while private international law cannot provide ready-made solutions for criminal justice, it can certainly trigger a process of cross-fertilization and thus impact positively the further development of judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
6. A second, fundamental viewpoint for the comparison at hand is the specific setting of European Civil Procedure. This area is characterized by a particularly articulate and successful variety of mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction. European Civil Procedure dates back to the 1968 Brussels Convention and today comprises several instruments, whose relevance will be scrutinized in Section 4 of this Chapter. Without ignoring the many differences, thus, it will be possible to draw some direct lessons from the solutions adopted in the field of civil litigation.
7. The first step of our comparative exercise must necessarily be a brief overview of the most relevant differences existing between private and criminal justice, which can have an impact on the topic of jurisdiction conflicts. This synthetic review will serve as a general framework, within which the comparative analysis carried out in the remainder of the Chapter will develop.
Procedural Architecture and Party Impulse
8. In principle, a conflict of jurisdiction can be either 'hypothetical' or 'actual'. In the former case, two different States lay claim upon the jurisdiction to adjudicate a certain dispute. In other words, given a dispute with certain features, the courts of two (or more) States have potentially the power to resolve it. In the latter case, instead, this hypothetical conflict materializes: proceedings dealing with the same subject matter are commenced in more than one jurisdiction. The actual conflict must be resolved, in order to avoid the risk of parallel proceedings leading to potentially irreconcilable outcomes. 9. The existence of a hypothetical conflict of jurisdiction depends exclusively on the contents of the law allocating jurisdiction: if under the applicable law more than one national court is competent to hear a certain case, a hypothetical conflict exists. By contrast, the emergence of actual conflicts hinges on party 2 It must be noted that, according to Article 45(1)(c) and (d) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (and analogous provisions in other instruments) the irreconcilability of decisions is a ground for refusal of recognition of judgments. European civil procedure, therefore, tries to prevent the situation where parallel proceedings lead to potentially irreconcilable judgments. On the Brussels I bis Regulation see, in detail, infra, Section 4.
impulse: the conflict can only exist inasmuch as the parties have commenced parallel proceedings in more than one State.
10. Against this background, we can note a first, fundamental difference between civil and criminal justice. On the one hand, in civil justice, the parties are generally both private (natural or legal) persons: they are put on an equal footing and it is up to them to decide whether to commence proceedings or not.
On the other hand, criminal cases can only be initiated by certain categories of parties, performing prosecutorial tasks. Therefore, the dynamics whereby an actual conflict of jurisdictions emerges in civil and criminal cases are fundamentally different.
11. Along the same lines, an additional difference between civil and criminal justice is that the latter is characterized by a certain fragmentation of the national laws governing the standing to commence proceedings. In particular, according to some systems of criminal procedure, only certain subjects (such as the Public Prosecutor) have the power to initiate the procedure. By contrast, other systems provide for more extensive standing, allowing e.g. the victim to start the case.
Furthermore, some national systems enshrine the principle of prosecutorial discretion, whereby the Public Prosecutor can decide whether or not to commence the proceedings, while other States are based on a mechanism of obligatory prosecution.
12. Such a fragmentation, which obviously cannot be explored in detail in this
Chapter, does not exist in the field of civil litigation. In a civil case, each party generally has the power to access the competent court and trigger the start of the proceedings. For this reason, it can be concluded that the way conflicts of jurisdiction materialize is structurally different, in civil and criminal cases. 
Relevance of the Problem of Inactivity

Relationship between Jurisdiction and Applicable Law
17. Further differences arise when we consider the consequences of allocating jurisdiction among various State courts. In civil litigation, the circumstance that a given court has jurisdiction entails, normally, 5 no consequence on the substantive law that will be applied to resolve the case. In particular, the problem of applicable law is resolved by another branch of private international law, which sets forth conflict rules determining which national law will apply, irrespective of which national court (if any) 6 will hear the case. As a result, it is entirely possible that the courts of a certain State will resolve a dispute by applying the substantive laws of another State.
18. By way of example, in the European Union, the law applicable to contracts is determined by the Rome I Regulation (Regulation no. 593/2008, replacing the 1980 Rome Convention). One of the main purposes of the enactment of uniform conflict rules in the EU is exactly avoiding that the allocation of jurisdiction to a given Member State trigger the application of a substantive law that would not be applied by the courts of another Member State, hence generating an unforeseen strategic advantage for one of the parties. 7 The parties also have an important margin of autonomy: in many settings they can enter into a choice-oflaw agreement, providing for the application of the substantive law they prefer.
19. In criminal matters, the allocation of jurisdiction has very different consequences, as it generally determines the substantive laws according to which criminal liability will be ascertained. This raises further questions as to the feasibility of a mechanism for the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal law, in the absence of a preliminary (and, obviously, debatable) large-scale approximation of substantive criminal law throughout the EU.
The Role of Private Autonomy
20. We have already mentioned private autonomy, when discussing choice-of-law agreements. In civil matters, however, the possibility for the parties to influence the exertion of jurisdiction on the part of State courts goes even further. In particular, the parties can enter an arbitration or a jurisdiction (or choice-ofcourt) agreement. 14 32. The transposition of the rationale at hand to the field of criminal justice leads to interesting and somewhat controversial results. Undeniably, the degree of predictability ensured by private international law does not seem to be entirely attainable in criminal cases. The main reason for this conclusion is that one of the aims of private international law is avoiding that, by allocating jurisdiction to a certain national court, this will result in the application of a different substantive law to a given set of facts. In criminal matters, the applicable substantive law will necessarily change, depending on the forum, and may even result in diverging qualification in terms of the legality or criminality of the 39. The main exception to the general principle of substance-neutrality is public policy. In different settings, States can invoke the public policy rule to avoid conferring legal effects upon a foreign legal instrument (e.g. a law, or a judgment). The scope of public policy, however, is extremely narrow: the clause can be invoked in exceptional circumstances only, to protect fundamental values and principles of the forum, but it can in no way act as a general shield against the operation of the conflict rules enshrined in private international law.
Application of Substance-neutrality to Criminal Justice
40. The question arises whether a system coordinating jurisdiction in criminal matters should also be substance-neutral. On the one hand, it could be argued that criminal and private law are fundamentally different in nature, inasmuch as the former serves the function of implementing substantive policies in the public interests, while the latter is often a neutral infrastructure for the expression of private autonomy. 16 Following this line of reasoning, it could be argued that substance should play a role in the determination of the rules for the allocation of jurisdiction. On the other hand, however, there are two fundamental reasons (described below) why the principle of substance-neutrality should be preserved in the realm of criminal justice too.
41. Firstly, if a system for the allocation of jurisdiction is not substance-neutral, it necessarily becomes a tool for the implementation of certain policies. Different
States, however, have adopted divergent approaches as to the appropriate degree of reaction against criminal behaviours: punishments may vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the areas of criminal relevance of conducts are not coextensive across different national systems. Even limiting the scope of our analysis to the European Union, a complete harmonization of this field of law would be impossible and, in any event, likely undesirable.
42. Therefore, in order for a system of jurisdiction rules to be acceptable, it must necessarily be neutral, i.e. it must operate effectively while at the same time respecting the substantive regulatory autonomy of each State participating in the system. Were jurisdiction rules to embrace substantive value choices, they would result in a creeping form of harmonization and, thus, they would not be accepted by those States whose national legal order enshrines divergent policies.
43. Secondly, even if one were to accept the premise that jurisdiction rules in criminal matters may take into account substantive considerations, this would result in a conundrum. Whose interests should the rules favour? One could maybe be tempted to assume that jurisdiction rules should take into account the 16 The different nature of rules conferring powers and rules imposing obligations was famously scrutinized by HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn, OUP 2012, first published in 1961).
prosecution's interests, consistently with the goal of repressing criminal activities. However, this approach is not viable in practice, as the interests of the prosecution are likely to change, depending on the nature of each national criminal justice system. In some jurisdictions, for example, the main goal of the prosecution could be the ascertainment of the truth in the public interest; by contrast, in other States, the prosecution could be entrusted with the task of obtaining a conviction, in accordance with the adversarial model. Once again,
given the fragmentation of national systems, neutrality seems to be the only possible solution.
44. The problem becomes even more complex if we enlarge the perspective and consider other stakeholders, such as the defendant (who likely has a legitimate interest to prevail on the merits and obtain an acquittal) or the victim (once again, with possible discrepancies, depending on the structure of national criminal procedure). Jurisdiction rules are not fit to determine how these different and potentially conflicting interests should be balanced. The principle of substance-neutrality, hence, should be adopted in the field of criminal justice.
45. One final possible objection against the principle of substance-neutrality concerns prescription/statute of limitations. Were a uniform system for the allocation of jurisdiction in criminal matters to be enacted, competence to prosecute may be conferred upon the authorities of a State where prosecution is time-barred and, thus, no longer possible. This could generate potential risks of impunity. Adhering to a strict interpretation of the principle of substanceneutrality, one could argue that the contents of the applicable statute of limitation fall within the substantive regulatory autonomy of the forum and, therefore, they are not a problem that should be dealt with through jurisdiction rules. However, it also seems possible to adopt a more moderate approach and create a carve-out for the case at hand, while at the same time preserving the central importance of substance-neutrality. can be seen as an a priori surrender of a criminal legal and justice system, limitedly to a specific case. In other words, by declaring that the prosecution of a crime is time-barred, national legal systems operate a simple choice of practical convenience: they abstain from prosecuting a crime in a particular instance for reasons of opportunity, without conceding anything in terms of general substantive policy choices. Prescription, then, could be differentiated from an acquittal on the merits and rather seen as a non-substantive outcome.
Were further research to confirm that this hypothesis is plausible, it would then become possible to consider statutes of limitation as a possible criterion for the (non-)allocation of jurisdiction, without breaching substance-neutrality.
47. In conclusion, substance-neutrality should be adopted as a general principle, as far as the allocation of jurisdiction in criminal matters is concerned. 48. Furthermore, the Guidelines do not categorically exclude that the relative sentencing powers of courts in different jurisdictions may be taken into account as a criterion for the selection of the appropriate jurisdiction.
19 Once again, a mechanism for the allocation of jurisdiction should not express value judgments on the contents of the national law applicable to the merits of the case, which falls within the regulatory discretion of each State.
49. The Guidelines also state that '(p)rosecutors should (…) ensure that the potential penalties available reflect the seriousness of the criminal conduct which is subject to the prosecution'. This evaluation of adequateness, however, seems to fall within the monopoly of the national lawmakers creating substantive criminal law. A system serving the purpose of allocating jurisdiction should never second-guess the policy choices underlying national substantive law.
Lessons from European Civil Procedure in Particular
50. This Section of the Chapter will focus on the instruments of European Procedural Law, with the purpose of identifying rationales and solutions that could potentially be transposed to the field of criminal justice. Examples will be drawn from different fields of civil litigation, such as civil and commercial claims and family matters. 53. Before the entry into force of the Brussels Convention, the rules allocating jurisdiction were not harmonized across the Member States. This, of course, generated a high risk of hypothetical conflicts among national courts, but it also raised another problem: many national laws contained criteria (or 'heads') for the allocation of jurisdiction that have been labeled as 'exorbitant'. The adjective 'exorbitant' alludes to the circumstance that, although under national law the courts are entitled to exert jurisdiction, the criterion for the attribution of jurisdiction seems to be unreasonable or 'difficult to justify'. 23 The following paragraphs will offer some examples of exorbitant heads, which help elucidate the importance of shared and reasonable jurisdiction rules. 
Reducing Overlaps in Jurisdiction
Different Heads of Jurisdiction in the Brussels I System
58. Having excluded the applicability of exorbitant heads of jurisdiction, the Brussels I system sets forth a harmonized regime by providing for three main types of criteria for the allocation of jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters:
-general jurisdiction;
-specific jurisdiction;
-exclusive jurisdiction.
The following paragraphs will provide a synthetic highlight of some relevant features of the aforementioned criteria.
General Jurisdiction
59. The general head of jurisdiction can be generally 27 relied upon for all cases falling within the scope of application of Brussels I. In particular, pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, 'persons domiciled in a Member
State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State'. This general rule of jurisdiction is in accordance with the principle actor sequitur forum rei, whereby the plaintiff must normally initiate proceedings in the State of the respondent.
60. Article 4(2) is justified by a strong rationale, which seems to be exportable to the field of criminal justice too. In particular, the position of the defendant is privileged because he/she did not choose to initiate the proceedings, but is bound by the legal consequences thereof because of the plaintiff's decision to 27 See, however, infra, para 4.2.6. on the exception of exclusive jurisdiction.
bring a claim. Hence, in order to mitigate the defendant's costs and inconveniences associated with the need to defend him/herself, the criterion of proximity to his/her domicile is adopted. The implicit assumption behind this regulatory choice is that organizing the defence and participating in the proceedings is easier, if jurisdiction is attributed to the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled. In criminal cases there is an even stronger rationale suggesting that the defendant's ease to defend him/herself should be taken into account, especially considering the importance of the subject matter of criminal proceedings and the seriousness of their possible consequences.
Another interesting aspect of Article 4 of the Brussels I bis Regulation is its
general rejection of the criterion of nationality. What matters, for the establishment of jurisdiction under the provision at hand, is exclusively the domicile, irrespective of whether the defendant is also a national of the State of
domicile. Once jurisdiction under Article 4 is established, then, each Member
State is left free to determine the internal rules of competence allocating jurisdictional functions to different courts within their territories. However, Article 4(2) specifies that these internal jurisdiction rules cannot differentiate between nationals and foreigners domiciled in the relevant Member State.
Specific Jurisdiction: The Case of Tort
62. Specific heads are additional jurisdiction rules that apply exclusively to particular scenarios, rather than covering the whole scope of application of the Brussels I system. By way of example, Article 7 of the Brussels I bis Regulation contains special rules of jurisdiction, inter alia, for matters relating to a contract and to tort. Specific heads of jurisdiction do not displace the general criterion of Article 4, but rather constitute an alternative: when the claim relates to a matter covered by a specific head, the plaintiff will be able to choose between the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled and the (potentially but not necessarily different) forum indicated by Article 7.
63. By adding specific heads of jurisdiction to the general head of Article 4, the Brussels I system allows, in certain cases, for possible overlaps of jurisdiction, potentially leading to parallel proceedings. As Section 4.3. will illustrate, the system resolves the problem at hand through the mechanism of lis pendens.
Before analyzing this aspect in detail, however, it is necessary to scrutinize the contents of some specific heads of jurisdiction, which could help inspire a regime of allocation of jurisdiction in criminal matters.
64. For the purposes of a comparison with criminal justice, the most obviously relevant specific head of jurisdiction is the one concerning torts. Albeit profoundly different in many respects, tort and criminal law are linked by some structural similarities, as implicitly suggested by the etymological root of the word 'delict', used in civil law jurisdictions to designate torts. In both tort and criminal cases, the merits of the dispute revolve around an alleged wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant. In some cases, the same behaviour could in fact be relevant from the point of view of both tort and criminal law. For this reason, the following paragraphs will offer an overview of the rules of the Brussels I system on jurisdiction in tortious matters.
65. In principle, the Brussels I system adheres to the principle of territoriality: pursuant to Article 7(2), 'in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict', jurisdiction is conferred upon the 'courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur'. Transposing this rationale to criminal justice, it would seem logical to equate the harmful event with the alleged incriminating conduct.
Despite this apparent simplicity, however, two practical complications may arise in practice and must be taken into account here: a) the place where the harm is suffered could be different from the place where the events giving rise thereto have taken place; b) the event itself could be transnational in nature and, for this reason, it may be difficult or even impossible to pinpoint it to the territory of a single State.
The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) offers interesting insights in both these respects. Let us briefly consider them. 67. In its later case-law, however, the CJEU has often differentiated Mines de Potasse d'Alsasce, so as to avoid unnecessary hypothetical conflicts of jurisdiction. In Kainz, for instance, the Court concluded that if a manufacturer faces a claim of liability for a defective product, the place of the event giving rise to the damage is the place where the product in question was manufactured, and not the place where the product was commercialized by a third party. 68. In sum, hence, the circumstance that the harm was suffered in a different State seems to be relevant, for the purposes of the Brussels I system, only when there is a particularly close connection between the event and its harmful consequences. By contrast, in all other cases, the difference between the place of the event and the place of the harm should not be invoked for the purposes of the allocation of jurisdiction, only the former being relevant.
(Cont'd) Differentiation between
(Cont'd) Cross-border Events
69. The case of harmful events that take place across national borders (and cannot thus be pinpointed to one State only) constitutes an interesting parallel for many types of cross-border crimes. As far as tort claims are concerned, a particularly relevant case is the one of events taking place in the press or on the Internet.
Torts committed through press were addressed by the CJEU in the famous
Shevill case. 34 The case concerned a claim for defamation via press, brought before English courts by a plaintiff residing in the United Kingdom. The claimant argued that the defendant, a French company, had caused harm by publishing plaintiff's interests is based. As a result, the plaintiff can bring a claim alternatively in the State where the publisher is established or in the State where the centre of his/her interests is based, and the jurisdiction will cover the entire harm. Furthermore, the plaintiff can sue in any other State where the online content is/was accessible, but exclusively with respect to the harm caused on the territory of that particular State.
73. For the purposes of a comparison with criminal law, the main lesson that can be drawn from eDate is the prevalence of factual criteria over purely technical ones. As subsequently repeated by the CJEU in Wintersteiger, 36 jurisdiction should be allocated on the basis of circumstances of fact, rather than on the basis of the place where the server is located. This principle seems to be exportable to the field of cybercrime, where reliance on technology-based criteria could entail significant complications and/or refer to jurisdictions which, in reality, have no factual links with the alleged crime.
74. It must also be noted that, in the case-law of the CJEU, the criterion of the 'centre of interests' is mainly limited to claims relating to personality rights. By 
Civil Claims Based on an Act Giving Rise to Criminal Proceedings
75. For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to mention another specific head of jurisdiction, which is related to criminal proceedings. Pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, if a civil claim for damages or restitution is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, the court seized of those proceedings has jurisdiction, to the extent that it can entertain civil proceedings under its own laws. This provision ensures coordination between the Brussels I regime and national laws conferring jurisdiction in civil matters upon a court seized of a criminal case arising out of the same facts. Albeit important for a basic understanding of the Brussels I system, however, this rule cannot probably serve as a specific source of inspiration for a mechanism of allocation of jurisdiction in criminal matters.
Exclusive Jurisdiction
76. In order to understand how the Brussels I system allocates jurisdiction, it is also important to acknowledge that heads of jurisdiction are organized hierarchically. In some cases, the Brussels I bis Regulation provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of a particular Member State, thus ruling all other Member State courts out. In these cases, of course, hypothetical conflicts of jurisdiction are entirely impossible. This is the case, inter alia, with rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable properties: under Article 24 (1) of the Brussels I bis Regulation, the courts of the Member State in which the property is located have exclusive jurisdiction. The rationale underlying the mechanism of exclusive jurisdiction is that, in certain cases, a Member State court is in a relation of particular proximity with the dispute and therefore must be preferred to all other Member State courts.
77. For the purposes of a comparison with criminal justice, two main lessons can be drawn from the mechanism of exclusive heads of jurisdiction. First of all, for some specific crimes, it could make sense to avoid hypothetical conflicts altogether, when it is possible to identify a particularly strong link between the case and a given State. Secondly, exclusive heads of jurisdiction influence the way the Brussels I system deals with the problem of actual conflicts of jurisdiction (i.e. parallel proceedings). In order to understand this aspect, however, it is first of all necessary to introduce the lis pendens mechanism and its context. operates: as clarified by the CJEU in Weber, 46 if the case is covered by an exclusive head of jurisdiction, the court second seized should not immediately stay its proceedings, but must first examine whether, by reason of a failure to take into consideration the exclusive jurisdiction, the decision of the court first seised will be recognised in the other Member States.
Putting the Lis Pendens
84. In conclusion, the lis pendens mechanism is best understood when put in context. Although its automatic character cannot be exported to the field of criminal justice, the basic structure of the Brussels I system is nonetheless able to inspire solutions for conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal matters. 95. Apart from their technicalities, the provisions at hand seem to be relevant for the purposes of a comparison with criminal law, mainly because of their underlying rationale. In family and succession litigation, similarly to criminal justice, it may be desirable to ensure that no jurisdictional gaps exist within the AFSJ and that, eventually, it will always possible to identify one competent court. However, by arranging the criteria progressively, the rules described above also acknowledge that not all criteria are equally important: some of them can only be invoked when absolutely indispensable. Since some rules confer jurisdiction only in the cases where some other rules cannot operate, the sequential order of the different heads manages to avoid not only jurisdictional gaps, but also hypothetical conflict of jurisdiction. By exporting the same conceptual framework to criminal cases, it could be possible to take into account fact-specificity while at the same time avoiding superfluous overlaps of jurisdiction.
Lessons from Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Family and
Lawful Move and Child Abduction: Is a Comparison with Arrest Possible?
96. One of the varying factual circumstances that are likely to play a role in an assessment of appropriateness, when allocating jurisdiction in criminal matters to a certain State court, is the fact that the defendant was arrested in that State.
In principle, this is perfectly comprehensible, also because the arrest is normally a strong indicator of a particular link between the alleged crime and the territory of a given State. Conferring relevance upon this factor, however, could also entail the risk of abuses. Take the example of two States whose prosecutors have an interest in prosecuting the same crime: in theory, it would be possible to imagine a situation where (at least) one of the two national authorities tries to obtain an arrest not because this is necessary (pursuant to the criteria of national criminal procedure), but simply in order to establish jurisdiction. Taken in its more extreme form, this scenario could lead to cases of 'forum shopping'
in criminal matters, which should absolutely be avoided. 100. Transposing these rules to the realm of criminal justice, it would be desirable to implement a mechanism whereby the place of arrest, which may generally be one of the relevant criteria for the allocation of jurisdiction, cannot be taken into account in cases where the arrest seems to have been requested for the sole or main purpose of securing jurisdiction.
Exchange of Information: The Role of Central Authorities
101. It is finally important to stress that a system for the allocation of jurisdiction can operate in practice only if information is exchanged effectively. By way of example, actual conflicts of jurisdiction can be resolved only if the relevant mechanism is triggered: to this end, therefore, it is first of all necessary to ensure that national judicial authorities be aware of the existence of parallel proceedings pending in another State. The problem seems to be particularly relevant in the field of criminal justice, where the defendant may sometimes have an interest not to disclose the existence of proceedings being conducted in a different jurisdiction.
102. Exchange of information could be facilitated by the institution of national central authorities, entrusted with the task of assisting with the application of the rules aimed at resolving conflicts of jurisdiction. In this respect, inspiration could be drawn from the Brussels II bis and the Maintenance Regulation, which specify the tasks of central authorities respectively in Chapter IV and VII. It should however also be noted that, if complemented by the institution of central authorities, a mechanism for the allocation of jurisdiction in criminal matters may entail additional costs.
Conclusions
103. The main argument of this Chapter has been that private international law, and
European civil procedure in particular, can offer useful inspiration towards the establishment of a regime for the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal matters. The first part of the article has set the scene by highlighting some structural differences between civil and criminal matters, which limit in some respects the feasibility of cross-sectoral legal transplants. Subsequently, the second part has drawn some lessons from private international law as a whole, namely stressing the importance of predictability and substance-neutrality.
Finally, the third part has offered an overview of some relevant provisions of European procedural law, highlighting the desirability of a uniform regime of allocation aimed at minimizing hypothetical conflicts of jurisdiction. Parallels between specific scenarios of civil litigation and criminal settings have also been drawn. In light of the above analysis, it can be concluded that, despite the many differences, many solutions adopted by private international law can be successfully transposed to criminal proceedings too.
